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Trends in Communist Media

3 Dec/75

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

3 DECEMBER 1975
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FRIS TRENDS

3 DECEMBER 1975

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PRESIDENT'S CHINA VISIT

"FRIENDLY" TALK WITH MAO HIGHLIGHTS PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

Chinese media treatment of President Ford and his party since their arrival in Peking on 1 December thus far has generally adhered to the strict protocol pattern followed during former President Nixon's February 1972 China trip.* The U.S. delegation's 2 December "friendly" meeting with Mao, as well as initial Chinese comment welcoming the visitors, underlined the measured improvement in Sino-U.S. relations that has taken place over the past three years. However, the Chinese comment softened the need for formal normalization of bilateral relations and stressed instead the importance of compatibility in U.S. and Chinese international policies, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on 1 December indicated, in the most explicit terms to date, that China sees a stronger U.S. strategic resolve against Soviet expansionism as the most important contribution the Ford Administration can currently make to enhance the Sino-American rapprochement.

As in the 1972 welcome for President Nixon, President Ford was greeted on arrival at Peking airport by a Chinese official delegation led by three CCP Politburo members, headed this time by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. The delegation was received that evening by NPC Chairman Chu Te and four other Politburo members, including Mao's wife Chiang Ching, and was then feted at a welcoming banquet hosted by Teng Hsiao-ping and attended by two other Politburo members. Teng led the Chinese side in working-level talks with the visitors on 2 and 3 December. On 2 December Mao received the President and his party for what NCNA described as "earnest and significant discussions . . . on wide-ranging issues in a friendly atmosphere."

The NCNA characterization of the Mao meeting marked an advance from NCNA's description of the 1972 "serious and frank" discussions Mao had with President Nixon. Otherwise Chinese media have avoided, as they did in 1972, characterizing the atmosphere at Sino-U.S. meetings and banquets.

Peking's media treatment again, as in 1972, has reflected the fact that the U.S. President's visit is one by a chief of state from a country with which China lacks normal diplomatic relations. Thus, there were no Peking reports of editorial comment on the visit or

* Nixon's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 February 1972, pages 1-6, and of 1 March 1972, pages 1-6.

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popular demonstrations welcoming the President, and Peking characterized the remarks at the welcoming banquet as "toasts" rather than the customary official speeches when chiefs of state visit. NCNA handling did reflect a slight advance over its coverage in 1972 by noting that a "welcoming ceremony" greeted the guests at the airport, and Teng in his 1 December banquet remarks said that the President had come for an "official" visit. Nixon had been described as merely making "a visit" in 1972.

Reports of President Ford's arrival, his meetings with Chinese officials, and texts of his and Teng's banquet toasts have been carried in NCNA's Chinese and English transmissions. NCNA followed past practice in muting comment critical of the United States during the course of the visit, though it has maintained its tough line against Soviet policies. In reporting the 28 November Washington meeting of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger with a visiting Chinese women's basketball team, NCNA had noted the President's characterization of his upcoming trip as "of great significance." NCNA also reported the President's 29 November remarks upon departure in which he stressed the importance of Sino-U.S. relations for stability in Asia and international security.

BILATERAL RELATIONS,
POLICY TOWARD MOSCOW

Teng Hsiao-ping's remarks at the 1 December banquet echoed stock Chinese assessments of Sino-U.S. bilateral relations which had been

set forth most recently in Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's remarks welcoming Secretary Kissinger's visit to China in October.** Teng asserted that "on the whole" relations had improved, and he praised Nixon's 1972 visit and the resulting Sino-U.S. Shanghai communique, calling the latter a "unique international document" which underlined both the "fundamental differences" and the "many points in common" held by the two sides. Teng expressed Peking's "welcome" to President Ford's past affirmations that the United States would abide by the communique and improve Sino-U.S. relations, and he voiced routine confidence that relations would be normalized "eventually" through both sides' "joint efforts."

By contrast, Teng devoted unusual stress to "a more important question" involving the need for U.S. vigilance against Soviet international expansion. Though not explicitly mentioning the USSR, Teng harshly attacked "the country which most zealously preaches peace" as "the

* Chiao's remarks are discussed in the TRENDS of 22 October 1975, pages 1 and 2.

most dangerous source of war," and he added that "the crucial point is what line or policy" the United States and China would pursue in the face of this mutual threat. Teng exhorted his audience to follow Peking's example, not to fear such "hegemonism," but to form a broad international front against it and to wage "tit-for-tat struggle." He added that the UCSR was "weak by nature" and "bullies the soft," but that it "fears the tough." Teng underlined the common U.S.-Chinese cause against Moscow by highlighting as "an outstanding common point" the Shanghai communique's call for opposition to international "hegemony."

Teng's exhortation for a stronger U.S. stance against Moscow avoided the sharp Chinese criticism of U.S. cooperation with Soviet detente efforts included in Chiao Kuan-hua's remarks during Kissinger's October visit. At that time Chiao had bluntly warned his audience against basing oneself on "illusions" and mistaking "hopes and wishes for reality," adding that such a policy played into Moscow's hands and would "only abet the ambitions of expansionism and lead to grave consequences."

MOSCOW STRESSES U.S. RESOLVE ON DETENTE DURING PEKING VISIT

Soviet media reports on the initial stages of the second visit to Peking by a U.S. President have stressed signs of U.S. resolve to continue pursuing detente with the USSR despite Chinese pressure for greater U.S. reserve toward Moscow. Moscow's relaxed view of Sino-U.S. discussions so far stands in sharp contrast to the sense of uneasiness over the possibility of Sino-U.S. collaboration against Soviet interests that characterized reporting on former President Nixon's visit in February 1972.

The 2 December TASS report of the initial exchange of toasts endeavored to portray a marked disagreement between Teng Hsiao-ping and President Ford on the issue of detente. TASS said Teng "fiercely attacked" detente and Soviet foreign policy and warned that "the American policy of relaxation of tension in relations with the USSR is wrong." In contrast, TASS reported President Ford as making a reasoned defense of detente. The dispatch also quoted press reports that Teng's speech was "so arrogant and hostile to detente" that the President, on seeing the text, considered the possibility of a more resolute reply. The report concluded by quoting a "leading American newspaper" as saying that, despite the "clamor" raised by Teng, "Gerald Ford would continue his course toward reaching agreement on strategic arms and other accords with the USSR."

A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to China on the 2d also stressed U.S. resolve to continue detente in the face of Chinese criticism. It cited the New York TIMES as saying that Kissinger's statement

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in Detroit that a "country's policy cannot be the object of diktat by another country" was intended to underline the fact that "the U.S. government will not sacrifice detente for U.S.-Chinese relations." The commentary also noted that "all foreign papers and news agencies have called attention to U.S. President Ford's reply to Teng Hsiao-ping's provocative remarks--that the United States is prepared to continue to strive for peaceful coexistence."

Moscow's treatment of President Ford's visit to Peking thus seems to fall into a pattern established during Secretary of State Kissinger's preparatory visit in October. While Soviet media on that occasion took exception to the Chinese use of the visit for direct attacks on detente and the USSR, they also left a clear impression of sustained disagreement between the Secretary and his hosts on this matter. By contrast, on the eve of former President Nixon's 1972 visit, a Yuriy Zhukov article, while careful not to impugn directly the President's motives in going to Peking, had warned that "certain U.S. circles" would like to use the visit to the detriment of U.S.-Soviet relations.

HANOI RADIO ACKNOWLEDGES PRESIDENT FORD'S ARRIVAL IN PEKING

Hanoi media have treated President Ford's arrival in Peking in the same cursory fashion used to report previous China trips by Secretary Kissinger. A 1 December Hanoi radio broadcast noted that the President was being accompanied by his wife and daughter, as well as Secretary Kissinger, and observed that the Presidential party was welcomed at the Peking airport by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. Former President Nixon's 1972 trip to China was not acknowledged in Vietnamese media, and it was not until after the signing of the Paris peace agreement that, in November 1973, Hanoi first reported a Kissinger visit to Peking.*

Although Hanoi media did not directly comment on the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971 and 1972, Vietnamese anxiety over the implications of the Peking move toward Washington was evident in thinly veiled polemical comment warning against underestimating the threat from the United States as the number one enemy. Such a view has again been pressed in a recent series of articles by the authoritative Vietnamese commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor).** The series was

* For a discussion of Hanoi's treatment of Kissinger's 19 October trip and earlier visits to the Chinese capital, see the TRENDS of 22 October 1975, page 3.

** Chien Thang's last previous article was a detailed post-mortem on the communist takeover in South Vietnam, published on 2 May 1975--two days after the victory. For background, see the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 3-5.

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published in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN beginning on 27 November, and so far has been only partially broadcast. Chien Thang lauds Vietnamese achievements in defending the "purity of revolutionary theory" and opposing "opportunist tendencies" and maintains that the "spearhead of the revolution" must be aimed at the United States—"the principal, most dangerous enemy of all mankind."

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U. S. - S O V I E T R E L A T I O N S

MOSCOW APPROVES SCHLESINGER DISMISSAL, EYES 1976 ELECTIONS

Almost a month after the U.S. Cabinet shuffle, Moscow has indicated that it believes the removal of former defense secretary Schlesinger could have a positive influence on U.S.-Soviet relations. Though Soviet media were initially reluctant to express an opinion on the Cabinet changes, recent articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and NEW TIMES clearly expressed satisfaction over Schlesinger's dismissal, attributing it to his opposition to Administration detente policies and to preparations by the President for the 1976 elections. NEW TIMES, though, qualified its approval by expressing a negative view of Secretary of State Kissinger's loss of his job as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The most forthright discussion of the episode was provided by PRAVDA's editor for the Americas, Georgiy Ratiani, in the paper's 27 November issue. Citing the opinions of U.S. commentators as authority, Ratiani linked the changes directly to the burgeoning election campaign. He implied that Schlesinger's public statements on a possible first use of nuclear weapons and on limited strategic options were helping the campaigns of potential candidates Reagan, Wallace and Jackson. Thus, he quoted with approval Ronald Steel's assessment in the New York TIMES that, in removing Schlesinger, Ford was "battening down the hatches for the presidential election, during which the President's one and only slogan for the campaign will be detente."

IZVESTIYA observer Nikolay Polyakov struck a didactic note in commenting on the Schlesinger dismissal in an article on 29 November. He linked the President's decision to Schlesinger's positions on military spending and the Helsinki CSCE summit and added that "this is what can happen to any other Western figure who tries to find consolation in unrealizable illusions, ignoring the stubborn facts of international life." In NEW TIMES No. 46, 1975, correspondent I. Andronov also brought up Schlesinger's resistance to detente but more specifically cited a Washington POST assertion that the former defense secretary had "launched a backstage campaign behind the President's back against the SALT talks with Moscow." Although Andronov apparently approved of Schlesinger's dismissal, he introduced a negative note by interpreting Kissinger's loss of the NSC post as a concession to conservatives.

Moscow has said that the 1976 elections are already having a significant impact on the formation of U.S. policy: IZVESTIYA's observer Matveyev on the 2d said that "the impending presidential elections in the United States are leaving their imprint on many phenomena of U.S. internal political life." Both PRAVDA and NEW TIMES, in the discussions cited

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above, left little doubt that Moscow feels that disputes over detente will be at the center of the campaign. Andronov, for instance, found it to be the "general opinion" that "foreign policy issues will be the central problem for discussion," and he echoed Rattiani's observation that detente will be President Ford's campaign slogan.

These articles serve to underscore Moscow's seeming concern over the 1976 elections and support for President Ford. In their first articles on the 1976 elections last summer, Soviet observers had foreseen trouble for the President in the coming campaign and had seemed at pains to avoid overidentification with him.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW STEPS UP CRITICISM OF WEST ON CSCE COMPLIANCE

In an apparent effort to divert attention from potentially embarrassing aspects of its own policy, Moscow has stepped up attacks in recent weeks against what it implies have been Western violations of the CSCE agreement. Although it has stopped short of alleging specific Western violations, it has implied that Western conduct has been inconsistent with the "noninterference" provisions of the CSCE document and it has charged Western societies with being remiss in the area of humanitarian rights.

INTERFERENCE IN PORTUGAL Typical of this new campaign was an English-language broadcast to North America on 29 November by Moscow radio commentator Valentin Zorin which asserted that talk about Soviet interference in the affairs of Portugal "is no more than a coverup for actual American interference." Zorin sarcastically noted that the "mythical Soviet interference" is presented as a "violation of lofty principles," whereas the "very real American interference" is no more than "concern for democracy." Zorin said that this, along with indications of U.S. interference in the Italian political scene, is enough to show that "Washington, rather than Moscow, is violating the principles reaffirmed at Helsinki."

Although Moscow has frequently charged "Western" states or "NATO" with actions contradictory to the CSCE agreements or to the "spirit" of Helsinki, complaints of violations of specific principles have been rare, and specific references to "U.S. violations" even more so. Thus Zorin's charge--in a relatively routine commentary on Portugal--is out of the ordinary. Radio commentator Viktor Shragin, appearing on the 23 November international observers roundtable discussion, also condemned the attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal as contravening "both the spirit and the letter of the final act." This escalation of the rhetoric on Portugal may reflect growing annoyance in Moscow over the continuing allegations of Soviet interference.

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES Shragin, in a radio commentary on 1 December, also accused the West of violating the CSCE agreement by not adequately publicizing the contents of the final document. Moscow has persistently criticized the Western countries for this shortcoming, but recent comment has focused this criticism on "those states" which rave "more loudly" than others about their adherence to the principles of freedom of information. A particular point of criticism has been the alleged failure of Western states to publish the document. The Western press proclaims it is "free,"

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IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Grigoryants wrote on 25 November, and thus Western papers cynically declare they are "not obliged to disseminate a document signed by governments." This argument "does not stand up to criticism," Grigoryants claimed, charging that it was not a question of "some formal obligations" but rather of civic and moral responsibility.

Recent Soviet comment has also concentrated on the West's poor showing with regard to cultural contacts and exchanges. The abundance of Western books, plays and movies available in the Soviet Union has often been contrasted to the sparsity of Soviet artistic works available in the West. Moreover, in addition to having little interest in genuine cultural contacts, "reactionary circles" in the West are accused of attempting to manipulate and exploit the humanitarian principles of the CSCE accord by launching propaganda campaigns and activities designed to subvert the ideological purity of the socialist countries--all under the "so-called free exchange of information and ideas." These "propaganda campaigns" are depicted as an effort to convince people that it is the socialist countries which are hindering exchanges and contacts between individuals. At the same time, Soviet commentators argue, the Western countries are trying to create the impression they are seeking closer contacts and more exchanges of ideas and information. In the words of IZVESTIYA deputy editor Nikolay Polyanov on 29 November, "some in the West would like to use the exchange of information not to strengthen peace and not for detente, but for quite opposite aims."

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR PRESSES GENEVA TALKS DESPITE PLO, SYRIAN, U.S. RESPONSES

Soviet media have continued to publicize Moscow's 9 November proposal to reconvene the Geneva conference, despite unenthusiastic reaction to this initiative displayed by a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization during a 24-28 November visit to Moscow and by President al-Asad in a 27 November interview.* Moscow has apparently rejected Washington's 2 December response to the Soviet proposal. According to U.S. press accounts on the 3d, the U.S. counterproposal suggested a preparatory conference of the original Geneva conference participants who would discuss reconvening the talks and the issue of additional [i.e., PLO] participants.

U.S. RESPONSE In an obvious but implicit reference to the U.S. counterproposal, Gromyko in a 2 December dinner speech for Kuwait's visiting foreign minister, reported that day by TASS, attacked the idea of "a so-called unofficial preliminary conference" advanced by "some people," calling it only an "evasion" of Geneva. Remarking that "it is said" that a preliminary meeting could discuss the issue of PLO participation, Gromyko dismissed this U.S. argument, asserting that an "obligatory" PLO presence had been "recognized by the whole world"--an apparent reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 3375 last month, which advocated PLO participation in any future talks on a Mideast settlement. Reaffirming Moscow's stand, Gromyko recalled the 9 November Soviet initiative and reiterated that the Geneva conference with "full and equal" PLO participation was "the most reliable way to consider the Mideast problem."

Gromyko's rejection of the U.S. proposal had been foreshadowed in remarks by TASS Director General L. Zamyatin on Moscow radio's "International Situation" program on 28 November. Noting that the United States had not responded to the USSR's 9 November proposal, Zamyatin referred to unidentified statements by Secretary Kissinger and concluded that "the Americans now prefer bilateral negotiations" and that "this supposedly means preparation for the Geneva conference itself." Restating the Soviet position, Zamyatin insisted that the conference was "an already-existing mechanism" with

* The Soviet proposal, presented in a 9 November note to the U.S. Government, is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 November 1975, pages 9-10.

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definite tasks and should be used. In an implicit reference to the U.S. position, he criticized "separate actions of a diversionary maneuver" for thus far preventing resumption of the conference.

SYRIAN STAND The Soviet proposal on Geneva was recently slighted by Syria. President al-Asad, in a 27 November interview with correspondents of TIME magazine carried by the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY on 30 November, sharply counterposed the Geneva conference and the UN Security Council as alternative forums in which issues of a Mideast settlement, including the Palestinian question, could be discussed and decided. Asked which approach he preferred, al-Asad said, "We prefer the Security Council." He explained that, whereas the USSR and the United States would cochair the Geneva conference and "play an equal role," in the Security Council "a number of other states will participate with them, and this is important and useful." In Moscow's only reaction thus far to al-Asad's interview, TASS on the 2d ignored his remarks on Geneva and the Security Council, mentioning only his criticisms of the Sinai II accord and U.S.-Israeli policy toward the PLO.

PLO VISIT Moscow's 9 November proposal on Geneva, which had stressed PLO participation "from the very beginning," received only faint praise during the 24-28 November visit to the USSR by a PLO delegation led by Yasir 'Arafat. A report on the visit, carried by TASS and the PLO's clandestine Voice of Palestine on the 28th, said simply that the "importance" of the proposal "was noted," echoing remarks by 'Arafat earlier in the visit. On a related issue, the report reflected no significant modification in the PLO's refusal to recognize Israel's right to exist, a stand which U.S. and Israeli leaders have singled out as precluding PLO participation in Mideast negotiations. The visit by the delegation was not otherwise noteworthy; Soviet treatment--airport reception, media coverage, and meetings--was in line with one or another past visit, and there was no perceptible change in public signs of Moscow's support of the PLO.*

Moscow was almost certainly displeased not to obtain a clear endorsement of its proposal on Geneva from the PLO. Some Soviet comment, as in a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 28th, contended that the

* 'Arafat's last PLO delegation visit to Moscow on 28 April-5 May 1975 is discussed in the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 13-16. Previous visits took place on 25-30 November 1974, discussed in the TRENDS of 4 December 1974, pages 5-8; and on 30 July-3 August 1974, discussed in the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 12-14.

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visit had in fact demonstrated PLO support for the Soviet initiative, citing as evidence that 'Arafat had stressed the "great importance" of the conference. The same commentary asserted, perhaps with an eye to Syria as well as the United States, that "nobody can mention any way of solving the Palestinian problem other than to convene the Geneva conference." (Al-Asad in a 6 October speech had established Syria's position that bilateral Israel-Syrian negotiations might be possible if linked to simultaneous talks on the Palestinian issue.)

PLO reluctance to endorse the Geneva conference is evidently due to opposition to the legal basis of the conference, Security Council Resolutions 338 (1973) and 242 (1967). As reiterated by PLO official spokesman 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar in an interview published in Kuwait's AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM on 24 November, the PLO stand on Geneva "is known and was defined by the Palestinian National Council. Basically we refuse to deal with Security Council Resolution 242, whether at an Arab or an international level, and this includes the Geneva conference itself." In the past, the PLO has indicated its rejection of those portions of Resolution 242 that refer to the Palestinian question as "the refugee problem" and that affirm, "in accordance with Article Two of the [UN] Charter," "acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." Resolution 338 would presumably be objectionable since, in addition to calling for Mideast peace negotiations, it calls for implementation of Resolution 242 "in all its parts."

The PLO would presumably endorse the Geneva conference, however, if it were convened under acceptable conditions. 'Arafat seemed to suggest this in remarks to Soviet journalists on the 27th, reported in a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 29th, when he referred to the Soviet initiative as having proposed resumption of the Geneva talks "on the new legitimate foundations of [UN General Assembly] Resolution 3236 [November 1974], concerning PLO participation in its capacity as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people." He noted further that Resolution 3236 "clarifies" the issue of Palestinian rights and refers to the "right to return and to self-determination and to establish their independent state on their land of Palestine." Similarly, 'Arafat said in a 30 November speech in Damascus--broadcast by the PLO's clandestine Voice of Palestine and ignored by Moscow media--that Resolution 3236 "canceled Resolution 242 at the Palestinian and international level." 'Arafat in all his remarks ignored the fact that the 9 November Soviet note on Geneva stated that the conference would seek a comprehensive Mideast settlement "on the basis of relevant UN decisions, first of all Security Council Resolution 338 and General Assembly Resolution 3236."

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P O R T U G A L

USSR ADOPTS CAUTIOUS STANCE AFTER LEFTIST MILITARY REBELLION

Soviet media have predictably adopted a cautious attitude toward the Portuguese situation since the 25-26 November abortive rebellion by leftist paratroopers and the subsequent purge of leftist military personnel. Following the lead of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), Moscow has retreated from the assertive position assumed after the success of the recent PCP-backed strike by construction workers and has again urged moderation and the unity of progressive forces.*

While Soviet media 10 days ago were emphasizing PCP calls for the resignation of the sixth government, both Moscow and the PCP have avoided directly criticizing the government since the rebellion. Instead they have confined themselves to the cautious reminder that "repressive measures are not the way out of the crisis," noting that reprisals against military leftists could lead to a "military hegemony of rightwing forces." Regarding the PCP itself, Moscow radio said the party had refuted "fallacious" charges of involvement in the revolt and had "tried to assist in a political solution" to the country's problems. Moscow has ignored rumors that PCP moderates were planning to oust Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal as a protest against the hardline tactics he has followed since the April 1974 coup.

Moscow's coverage of the paratrooper revolt highlighted PCP statements which seemed to reflect the party's changing stance as the fate of the revolt was decided. Thus, TASS on 26 November replayed an ambiguous PCP statement which, while saying that "only reaction can benefit by these clashes," nevertheless insisted on "strong action to defend revolutionary gains" and urged party members to "preserve their organizations and continue their activity even with the restrictions imposed by the authorities." A later PCP statement, publicized by TASS on the 29th, acknowledged that "events of recent days signify a heavy defeat of the left forces" and condemned "leftist radicalism" as "a way toward defeat." The PCP made a clear distinction between the Socialist Party and the People's Democratic Party—a distinction that had been blurred in some comment before the revolt—and called, as often before, for a government excluding the Popular Democrats. Turning to the Socialist Party and its military allies,

* Soviet treatment of the construction workers' strike is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 November 1975, pages 14-15.

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the statement warned that forming an alliance with reactionaries as a result of the rebellion would lead "to their own defeat and the ruin of the revolution."

Since the abortive revolt, Moscow has followed the same careful line, Eduard Kovalov's TASS reports on 29 and 30 November gingerly urging the lifting of the state of siege and quoting unnamed "democratic circles" as saying that "repressive measures are not the way out of the present critical situation." Moscow has reported without comment the continuing purge of leftwing military leaders, PRAVDA's Kotov simply noting on the 29th that the Revolutionary Council had "satisfied the request" of COPCON commander Gen Otelo de Carvalho and army chief of staff General Fabiao to be relieved of their positions, Fabiao to be replaced by Gen Vasco Lourenco. Kotov's bland account contrasts with the Soviet media's strong, albeit indirect, criticism of the government's earlier attempt to force Carvalho out of his less important secondary post as chief of the Lisbon military region and to replace him with the moderate Vasco Lourenco. At that time, Kotov had noted, in a 24 November PRAVDA article, that the decision to remove Carvalho, together with the government's suspension of activities, were "organized by rightwing forces" and had "stocked the atmosphere in the country to the limit."

Kotov's handling of the sixth government's 19 November decision to suspend its activities typified other Moscow coverage, which branded the decision as attempted "blackmail." A 21 November TASS report, for example, asserted that a huge demonstration in Lisbon had "demanded resignation of the sixth government and the setting up of a genuinely leftwing government." And another TASS dispatch the following day quoted the PCP as saying that the suspension was tantamount to resignation and that the government "must cede its place to a seventh provisional government, which would include representatives of the left forces and would pursue a left policy."

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USSR - YUGOSLAVIA

PRAVDA SUPPORTS TITO CAMPAIGN AGAINST "COMINFORMIST" DISSIDENTS

After weeks of silence, Moscow has now acknowledged Yugoslavia's recently accelerated campaign against anti-Tito dissidents in a 27 November PRAVDA article signed I. Aleksandrov which implied support for the crackdown and denied any connection with the dissidents whom Belgrade has labeled "Cominformist." The article, which appears against a backdrop of increasingly frequent Belgrade comments linking the problem of the dissidents to Soviet-Yugoslav relations, was promptly welcomed by an article in the 28-30 November Belgrade POLITIKA, with its Moscow correspondent declaring that "it can be reliably stated" that the PRAVDA article "reflects the views of the highest Soviet political leaders." In fact I. Aleksandrov is a pseudonym long associated with major Soviet policy pronouncements.*

The PRAVDA article referred to the campaign only indirectly and euphemistically, portraying it as a continuation of the Tito's regime's post-1972 efforts to reassert the party's "leading" role in society, thus suggesting that the chief target of the campaign has been the liberal dissidents opposed to greater centralization of power. Accordingly, the article warned Belgrade against "certain Western circles" which continue to support "antisocialist and reactionary elements" which hope to restore the "bourgeois-monarchical system" in the country.

PRAVDA similarly eschewed the overtly anti-Soviet term "Cominformist" in referring to the dissidents, referring to them more broadly as individuals with "dogmatic" views who "demagogically try to portray themselves as the most 'orthodox' champions of socialism in Yugoslavia." The article employed even more generalized phraseology in denying any involvement with Yugoslav dissidents. Thus, it denounced the Western media for "trying to prove what does not exist, that is, the socialist countries' support for conspiratorial sectarian groups that represent no one but themselves."

Despite PRAVDA's euphemistic terminology, the POLITIKA article suggested Belgrade's satisfaction with the Soviet repudiation in interpreting it as "undoubtedly expressing a negative attitude toward the activities of the Cominformist groups" in Yugoslavia and in other countries, namely the Warsaw Pact members. Belgrade's satisfaction may well have

* In the past, I. Aleksandrov articles have usually been published across the bottom of inside pages in PRAVDA, the same format as the authoritative PRAVDA editorial articles. However, in this case it appeared in a column normally reserved for routine international issues.

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been reflected also in the fact that on the day that the article appeared, the two countries announced that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic would pay an official, friendly visit to Moscow 8-11 December.

BACKGROUND During the six-week old campaign, Yugoslav comment has consistently stopped short of charging Soviet bloc support for the Cominformists. The first suggestion that a direct link existed between the Cominformist problem and Belgrade's relations with Moscow was raised in an 11 November speech by Executive Committee secretary Todo Kurtovic.* Kurtovic contended that the Cominformist activities violated the principles of the 1955 and 1956 Belgrade and Moscow declarations which provide the basis for cooperation between the two countries. However, he carefully left an inference that it was the Cominformists--rather than Moscow itself--who were abusing the declarations. Subsequent Yugoslav comment has tended to support that inference. Senior Croatian party leader Bakaric on 20 November, for example, blatantly charged that the Cominformists "seek outside intervention" but added that Belgrade had received "positive assurances" from the Soviet bloc countries that they do not support the Cominformists. Similarly, Bakaric asserted that Belgrade's relations with the bloc countries were "constantly improving" although the Cominformists sought to damage those relations in order to achieve their own political ambitions.

* For a discussion of the Kurtovic speech, see the TRENDS of 12 November 1975, pages 13-14.

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LAOS

PATHET LAO-CONTROLLED CONFERENCE PROCLAIMS PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

A Pathet Lao-controlled "national conference of people's representatives," meeting in Vientiane on 1-2 December, has rubberstamped the abolition of the coalition government in Laos and the abdication of King Savang Vatthana. Vientiane's domestic radio announced on 3 December that the conference had completed its work after reconstituting Laos as a "people's democratic republic" and appointing a president, government, and advisers. The names of the new officials will presumably be announced in a communique on the conference which Lao media have announced will be released on 4 December.

The conference, convened under the direction of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) Central Committee, was the final step in a well-orchestrated Pathet Lao campaign to complete their consolidation of power. Following nationwide provincial-level elections on 23-24 November, mass rallies in Vientiane and the provinces adopted resolutions which denounced the two existing state bodies--the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) and the National Political Consultative Council (NPCC)--established by the Vientiane agreement ending the war in 1973, labeling them as "inconsistent" with the new Laotian situation. The resolutions demanded that the LPF Central Committee convene a "national conference of people's representatives" to complete the process of ridding Laos of the "feudalist" regime.

At the same time, Pathet Lao control had been further reinforced by the convening of an unusual joint session of the PGNU and the NPCC at Viengsay, on November 25-26, presided over by LPF Chairman Souphanouvong. Media reports on the joint meeting provided no details of subjects discussed other than to note that an "important resolution" had been unanimously adopted. While the Pathet Lao radio noted the arrival of the PGNU and NPCC members in Viengsay on the 23d and 24th, there have been no reports that any of the attendees have returned to Vientiane.

The campaign to abolish the former government received the public sanction of the communist Lao People's Revolutionary Party in a 28 November editorial in the party organ, SIANG PASASON. The editorial, which coincided with several rallies and demonstrations in Vientiane, welcomed the newly elected councils which had "overthrown and replaced" the old regime at the village, district, and provincial level. It also voiced approval for the Lao people's "legitimate demand" that the LPF Central Committee convene a conference to settle "important problems" and complete the dismantling of the existing governmental structure.

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CONSOLIDATION
OF LAO RADIOS

The Pathet Lao moves to gain complete control of the government were accompanied by a consolidation of national radios. The Lao national radio, located in Vientiane, and the LPF's former clandestine Radio Pathet Lao integrated their programming and broadcast schedules into one "National Radio Broadcasting Station," effective November 25th. Vientiane Radio announced that the new schedule would consist of two services, one for a domestic audience broadcast in Lao, and an international service, to be broadcast in Thai, Vietnamese, Cambodian, French, and English. Initial monitoring reports have confirmed the new programming schedule.

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VIETNAM

DRV, PRG MEDIA IGNORE KISSINGER REMARKS ON IMPROVED RELATIONS

Vietnamese media are not known to have mentioned Secretary of State Kissinger's 24 November address before the Economic Club of Detroit in which he affirmed that Washington envisages the eventual normalization of relations with Indochinese countries and would consider mutually beneficial interim arrangements in such fields as travel and trade. While it is unusual for Hanoi to completely ignore a speech by the Secretary, its failure to report the remarks on relations is consistent with the Vietnamese media handling of previous statements he has made on the subject.

The question of improving U.S.-Vietnamese relations, similarly, was not raised by Hanoi media earlier this fall in comment following the Vietnamese announcement on 20 October that it was releasing Americans who were being held in Vietnam. The standard Vietnamese formulation on relations with Washington--demanding that the United States give up its "hostile" attitude and carry out its "obligation" for postwar assistance to Vietnam--was most recently repeated by PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh at a 21 November Saigon press conference.

BACKGROUND Last June Hanoi media had promptly commented on Secretary Kissinger's 18 June speech before the Japan Society in New York, with an unsigned 21 June NHAN DAN commentary criticizing the Secretary's appraisal of the situation in Indochina but not acknowledging his specific statement on future relations. While ignoring the Secretary's assertion that "we are prepared to look to the future" with regard to the new regimes in Asia, the NHAN DAN article did reiterate Hanoi's customary expression of willingness to put U.S.-DRV relations on a normal basis once the United States abides by the Paris agreement and implements its "obligation" under Article 21 of the agreement on aid in the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam.*

Earlier in the year Vietnamese leaders had given signs of a more forthcoming stand on improving relations. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong--in his 3 June National Assembly speech--suggested that normal relations could be effected if the United States implemented "the spirit" of Article 21, a proposal not known to have been repeated

* See the TRENDS of 25 June 1975, pages 6-7, for a discussion of the NHAN DAN commentary on Kissinger's 18 June speech.

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by other Vietnamese leaders. At the same National Assembly meeting, DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, while taking the conventional line on U.S. observance of "all the basic principles" of the Paris agreement, asserted that the DRV Government was ready to discuss with the United States such "pending problems" as U.S. aid and the search for American personnel still missing in Vietnam.*

PARTY JOURNAL SETS TASKS FOR UNIFIED NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

Vietnamese media continue to focus attention on the question of reunification in the wake of the 15-21 November Saigon political consultative conference which authorized plans for nationwide elections leading to formation of a single central government. Sessions of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee and the PRG Advisory Council were also held in recent days to hear reports on the results of the conference and announce that meetings will be held later this month of the DRV National Assembly and a southern conference of "people's representatives."

One of the most authoritative discussions of reunification came a few days after the consultative conference in an editorial in the November issue of the Vietnamese party theoretical journal HOC TAP, broadcast by Hanoi radio in two installments on 23 and 24 November. Discussing the "tasks" facing Vietnam during the "new stage," HOC TAP explained that the entire country must concentrate on restoring and developing production, stepping up socialist industrialization, and bringing the economy to large-scale production. The editorial also acknowledged that there were different situations in the North and South, noting that the South is "only now entering the stage of transition to socialism" and therefore has different requirements than the North.

Listing specific tasks for South Vietnam, the HOC TAP editorial gave priority to the need to build a "people's revolutionary administration," suppress "counterrevolutionaries," and eliminate the "comprador bourgeoisie" and traces of the feudal landlord class. (Speaking before the opening session of the political consultative conference on 15 November, the head of the DRV delegation, Politburo member Truong Chinh, had cited

* Pham Van Dong's and Nguyen Duy Trinh's National Assembly remarks on U.S.-DRV relations are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, pages 12-13, and of 11 June 1975, pages 6-8, respectively.

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similar duties as the "unfinished tasks" of the South's national democratic revolution.) HOC TAP also portrayed the restoration of production, elimination of unemployment, settlement of financial and currency problems, and improvement of economic management as important specific tasks facing the South. In another context, the editorial noted that agricultural collectivization would be carried out in the South in close coordination with such practical problems as water conservancy, mechanization, and labor reorganization.

The economic problems facing the South were also discussed at some length in a 28 November GIAI PHONG editorial broadcast by Saigon radio. The Saigon paper warned of the difficulty in shifting from a capitalist to a socialist economy, acknowledging that there would be "a great deal of confusion" and that the lack of economic attention to economic matters during the war meant that "our capabilities are limited." Dealing with the question of foreign assistance in candid terms, the paper noted that future economic aid will no longer be given gratuitously, but will be on a "pay back for what you borrowed, charge interest on your capital and buy in order to sell" basis.

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K O R E A

PYONGYANG RESTRAINS COMMENT ON FUTURE OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Since the 18 November UN General Assembly's adoption of rival U.S. and DPRK-backed resolutions on the Korean question, DPRK media have continued to press the line, introduced in March 1974 and alluded to in the DPRK-supported UN resolution, that a DPRK-U.S. peace treaty should replace the Korean armistice agreement. The media have also continued to call for the dissolution of the UN Command, and have linked U.S. troop withdrawal with such a dismantling, but have failed to reiterate Pyongyang's contention--first advanced last August--that the end of the UN Command means the end of the armistice.

Recent Pyongyang press comment has notably failed to repeat DPRK objections to continuation of the armistice agreement. For example, a 2 December NODONG SINMUN commentator's article, carried by KCNA, denounced Secretary of State Kissinger's recent call--in his 24 November Detroit speech--for a joint meeting of U.S., PRC, DPRK and ROK representatives to resolve the Korean question. But it failed to acknowledge his proposal that the four-party conference discuss dissolution of the UN Command while "perserving the Korean armistice agreement." By contrast, Pyongyang had strongly objected to Kissinger's original proposal for preserving the armistice agreement when he first raised it in his 22 September UNGA speech.*

Similarly a 29 November NODUNG SINMUN commentary, reported by KCNA on the 29th, criticized some of ROK President Pak Chong-hui's remarks in a 26 November AFP interview, but ignored his assertion that the armistice must be preserved in its "essential structure." Nor did the commentary reply to Pak's warning that if Pyongyang used the UN vote as a basis for boycotting future meetings of the Military Armistice Commission--set up by the 1953 armistice agreement to oversee the armistice and to discuss violations of it--the ROK would regard that as "rescinding the cease-fire agreement and destroying peace in Korea." Pyongyang has never indicated publicly that passage of its resolution would, by itself, abrogate the armistice agreement or that passage of the resolution would be used as a reason to boycott MAC meetings. The last MAC meeting was held on 24 October, prior to both the UNGA decision and the First Committee's vote adopting both resolutions. KCNA

* DPRK reaction to Kissinger's 22 September UNGA speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 1-2.

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on 2 December reported a meeting in Panmunjom on the 1st between security officers of the two sides to the armistice commission, at which the North Koreans routinely protested "criminal actions" by U.S. troops in the joint security area.

OTHER ISSUES Although the DPRK won a victory of sorts when the UN approved its resolution, along with the one backed by the United States, Pyongyang so far has not shown much optimism regarding the possibility that its resolution will actually be implemented. In critical comment on the U.S. stand, North Korean propaganda has noted the U.S. position that the UNGA vote does not affect the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, and the 2 December NODONG SINMUN commentary on Kissinger's Detroit speech reported that the Secretary of State made it plain the United States intended to "ignore" the pro-Pyongyang resolution. More explicitly, in a wide-ranging 26 November interview with the Japanese newspaper MAINICHI--which DPRK media have not carried, although Pyongyang radio on 2 December did report that the interview was published in MAINICHI--Kim Il-song stated that because of U.S. "interference" he was not "optimistic" that the DPRK-supported resolution would be implemented. Pyongyang has not directly stated what its line of action would be if its resolution was not implemented, but in a 26 November interview carried by Japan's KYODO agency on the 28th, the head of the DPRK's delegation to the United Nations suggested that the North intended to return next year to the UNGA to give the United States its "most humiliating defeat" in the General Assembly on the Korean debate.

NOTES

CZECHOSLOVAK VISIT TO USSR: The routinely phrased communique on President and CPCZ General Secretary Husak's 25-29 November official Moscow visit appeared designed to convey an impression of continued stability and serenity both in Moscow-Prague relations and in the Czechoslovakia internal scene. Husak had been in the Soviet Union twice before this year, in the summer when he was said to have been vacationing there, and last March when he went to Moscow for what was described as a "short, friendly visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee." The "official" visit comes at the end of the year which saw a hardening of the stance toward liberals purged after the 1968-69 crisis, most notably Husak's April charge of treason against his predecessor Dubcek. Brezhnev in his welcoming speech on the 25th clearly alluded to the crisis when he voiced satisfaction that Prague had "overcome the effects of the crisis into which forces hostile to socialism plunged the country." The joint communique, on the other hand, simply noted that the Czechoslovaks were consolidating the leading role and authority of the communist party and building an advanced socialist society. The communique underscored the importance of the Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship treaty signed by Brezhnev and Husak in Prague on 6 May 1970, a treaty which had incorporated for the first time the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine on "defense of socialist gains"--the rationale for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. In line with recent Moscow and Prague comment, the communique took an uncompromising stance on the long-delayed conference of European communist parties, prefacing its endorsement of the conference with an attack on the Maoists and a vow to combat "anticommunism, revisionism, and opportunism of any kind."

PRC EDUCATIONAL POLICY: A new shift away from the ideologically motivated educational reforms announced during the cultural revolution appears underway in China, as indicated by recent Chinese provincial broadcasts urging improvement in the quality of education in PRC schools. The new drive to raise the quality of education and achieve a better balance in the schools between traditional academic subjects and political study began last month in Shanghai with an unusually frank 10 November broadcast warning that it was not permissible to relax "intellectual education." Following up on its endorsement of intellectual training, Shanghai radio on 29 November noted that the present objective of "open door" education, a principle used in the cultural revolution to admit many scholastically unqualified but highly political students, is to develop a "well planned and well arranged program so that the school not only opens its doors to society but also improves the quality of its education in the process." Shanghai's initiative

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in openly upgrading the quality of education in local schools was emulated in a 29 November broadcast from neighboring Anhwei Province. This broadcast called upon local school officials to place more stress on scientific research and to urge teachers "to improve their professional levels in order to do their part in achieving the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology."

MOSCOW ON SINO-JAPANESE TREATY: A 26 November PRAVDA article by Tokyo correspondent I. Latyshev has renewed Moscow's longstanding warning that inclusion of an antihegemony clause in a Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship would be considered a "hostile" action against the Soviet Union. The article may have been a delayed response to remarks by Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa, on 8 November in the Diet, reiterating the desire of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to show some flexibility on the issue. Warning that adoption of "abstract" or "diffuse" interpretations of the antihegemony clause would not change the basic anti-Soviet nature of the provision, Latyshev claimed that Peking had failed with "frontal pressure" on Tokyo and thus was now relying on supporters within the LDP and in the ranks of "certain parties of the parliamentary opposition, above all the Socialist Party." Soviet displeasure with the pro-Peking element of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) for supporting the Chinese on the hegemony issue has been expressed in sharp criticism ever since JSP Chairman Narita virtually accepted the Chinese position on hegemony while visiting the PRC in May.

PRC-EAST TIMOR. Peking has responded cautiously to the 28 November proclamation of East Timor independence from Portugal and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor by the Revolutionary Front for Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN). Claiming that FRETILIN "actually got control" of East Timor in mid-August, a 1 December NCNA report favorably characterized FRETILIN's advocacy of the formation of a "democratic, anticolonial and anti-imperialist republic" and of a nonaligned foreign policy as "ideas which have won the support of the people of East Timor." The report did not mention opposition to FRETILIN on the part of the other political groups, and it did not refer to Indonesia's concern over the recent developments there. Since Peking broke its silence on events in the country in mid-October, the Chinese have restricted coverage to infrequent NCNA dispatches favorably noting FRETILIN pronouncements and actions in opposition to other East Timor political groups and to Indonesia, while avoiding explicit criticism of FRETILIN's opponents. Most recently, NCNA on 29 November replayed without comment a REUTER report of a 25 November FRETILIN military appeal for international intervention against Indonesia's "armed aggression" in East Timor, noting another Western press disclosure that "Indonesian troops were preparing for a full scale invasion."

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THAI CP ANNIVERSARY: The PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) has marked the 1 December 33d anniversary of the Thai Communist Party at a lower level than in past years and with a more sober assessment of Thai CP prospects. For the first time in at least three years there was no Thai CP statement marking the anniversary, but instead only a VOPT editorial on 1 December. While last year's statement had described the "excellent situation" facing the party, this year's VOPT editorial simply observed that "the internal and external situation is favorable," noted the need for longterm struggle against stubborn international and domestic adversaries, and warned that "U.S. imperialism" had been forced to resort to "new tactics" by recent communist victories in Indochina. The VOPT editorial did not attack the Khukrit government by name, nor did it mention Thailand's normalization of relations with the PRC this summer. Like last year's Thai CP statement, the VOPT editorial reaffirmed the primacy of the Thai CP-led armed struggle, but it played down last year's stress on urban mass movements as a crucial form of political struggle.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 - 30 NOVEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2796 items)</u>			<u>Peking (919 items)</u>		
World Peace Council	(4%)	15%	UNGA 30th Session	(9%)	14%
Conference, Leningrad			[Charter Revision	(--)	6%]
[Brezhnev Speech	(2%)	6%]	Debate		
Czechoslovak Party-	(--)	11%	[Disarmament Debate	(2%)	3%]
Government Delegation			PRC Earth Satellite Launch	(--)	6%
in USSR			Albanian Liberation 31st	(--)	5%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	3%]	Anniversary		
Yugoslav National Day	(--)	5%	Surinam Independence	(--)	4%
China	(6%)	4%	[Chou Greetings	(--)	3%]
Italian President Leone	(9%)	3%			
in USSR					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.